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Abstract
Advertisers that engage in real-time bidding (RTB) to display their ads commonly
have two goals: learning their optimal bidding policy and estimating the expected ef-
fect of exposing users to their ads. Typical strategies to accomplish one of these goals
tend to ignore the other, creating an apparent tension between the two. This paper
exploits the economic structure of the bid optimization problem faced by advertisers
to show that these two objectives can actually be perfectly aligned. By framing the
advertiser’s problem as a multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem, we propose a modified
Thompson Sampling (TS) algorithm that concurrently learns the optimal bidding pol-
icy and estimates the expected effect of displaying the ad while minimizing economic
losses from potential sub-optimal bidding. Simulations show that not only the pro-
posed method successfully accomplishes the advertiser’s goals, but also does so at a
much lower cost than more conventional experimentation policies aimed at perform-
ing causal inference.
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1 Introduction
RTB systems, which leverage auctions to programmatically allocate user impressions to
multiple competing advertisers, continue to enjoy widespread success in digital advertis-
ing (Varian, 2009; Yuan et al., 2013; Choi et al., 2017). Assessing the effectiveness of such
advertising remains a lingering challenge in research and practice. This paper presents
a new method to deliver causal inference on advertising bought through such mecha-
nisms. Our method leverages the economic structure of second-price sealed-bid auctions,
which are ubiquitous in RTB systems, embedded within a MAB setup for online adap-
tive experimentation. The algorithm we present develops estimates of the causal effects
of advertising while minimizing the costs of experimentation to the advertiser by simul-
taneously learning the optimal bidding policy that maximizes her expected payoffs from
auction participation. Our approach pertains to a nascent literature that leverages MABs
for causal inference, more broadly.
There are two main challenges to developing an online experimental design for RTB
ads. Firstly, measuring the average treatment effect (ATE) of advertising requires com-
paring outcomes of users who are exposed to ads with outcomes of users who are not.
The complication is that ad-exposure is not under complete control of the experimenter
because it is determined by an auction. This precludes simpler bandit designs for mea-
suring the ATE in which exposure or non-exposure to ads are arms and outcomes under
exposure or non-exposure are rewards. Instead, we need a design in which the experi-
menter controls only an input to the auction (bids), but wishes to perform inference on
the effect of a stochastic outcome induced by this input (ad-exposure). In addition, in
many advertising situations it is in the interest of the advertiser to account for observable
heterogeneity when assessing ad-effectiveness. In such cases, inference would have to be
performed on heterogeneous treatment effects, and the object of estimation would no longer
be the ATE, but rather the conditional average treatment effect (CATE) at a series of values
of observed variables.
A second complication is the need to balance the goal of learning the expected effect
of ad-exposure (“inference goal”) with the goal of learning the optimal bidding policy for
the advertiser (“economic goal”). The tension is that finding the best bidding policy does
not guarantee estimating ad-effectiveness and vice-versa. At one extreme, with a bidding
policy that delivers on the economic goal, the advertiser could win most of the time, mak-
ing it difficult to measure ad-effectiveness since outcomes with no ad-exposures would
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be scarcely observed. At the other extreme, with pure bid randomization the advertiser
could estimate unconditional ad-effectiveness (the ATE) or how ad-effectiveness varies
with observed heterogeneity (the CATEs) and deliver on the inference goal, but may end
up incurring large economic losses in the process.
The contribution of this paper is to present a bandit design and statistical learning
framework that address both these considerations. In our design, observed heterogeneity
is summarized by a context, x, bids form arms, and the advertiser’s economic payoffs from
the bids form the rewards, so that the best arm maximizes the advertiser’s expected payoff
from auction participation given x. Exploiting the economic structure of second-price
sealed-bid auctions, we show that, under conditions we outline, the bid that maximizes
the advertiser’s expected payoff from auction participation at a given x corresponds to
the CATE of the ad at the value x, or ATE(x). Therefore, in our experimental design,
discovering the best bid and estimating ad effectiveness are the same task, so that the
inference and economic goals are perfectly aligned.
To implement the design, we present a TS algorithm customized to our auction en-
vironment, trained online via a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method. The algo-
rithm adaptively chooses bids across rounds based on current estimates of which arm is
the optimal one. These estimates are updated on each round via MCMC through Gibbs
sampling, which leverages data augmentation to impute the missing potential outcomes
and the censored winning bids in each round of the bandit. Simulations show that the
algorithm is able to recover treatment effect heterogeneity as represented by the CATEs
of advertising and considerably reduces the expected costs of experimentation compared
to non-adaptive “A/B/n” tests.
1.1 Related literature
Our paper lies at the intersection of three broad fields of study: causal inference, multi-
armed bandits and auction theory. We will now describe how it relates to the existing
literature, confining our attention to studies that touch at least two of these three topics.
Performing causal inference with bandits is complicated by the adaptive nature of
data collection, wherein future data collection depends on the data already collected. Al-
though bandits possess attractive properties in finding the best arm, estimates of arm-
specific expected rewards typically exhibit adaptive bias (Xu et al., 2013; Villar et al., 2015).
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In particular, Nie et al. (2018) show that archetypal bandit algorithms such as Upper Con-
fidence Bound (UCB) and TS compute estimates of arm-specific expected rewards that are
biased downwards. Adaptive data collection also complicates frequentist statistical infer-
ence, requiring adjustments for computation of valid standard errors, test statistics and
confidence intervals.
Existing approaches to inference with bandits differ based on whether they pertain
to the offline setting, where pre-collected data is available to the analyst, or the online set-
ting, where data arrive sequentially, with the online literature being relatively more recent.
Unlike online methods, offline methods are meant to be implemented ex-post, which im-
plies that the data collection, though done sequentially, is typically not made explicitly
to facilitate inference upon its completion. Also, the methods are meant for retrospective
application on logged data, which means that data collection does not explicitly reflect
in real-time the progress made towards the inferential goal. Offline methods for logged
bandit data that reflect adaptive data collection include Strehl et al. (2010), Dudík et al.
(2011), Li et al. (2015), Swaminathan and Joachims (2015), Jiang and Li (2016), Thomas
and Brunskill (2016), Athey and Wager (2017), Wang et al. (2017b), Diemert et al. (2018),
Deshpande et al. (2018), Kallus (2018a), Nie et al. (2018) and Sawant et al. (2018).
This paper relates more closely to the online stream. Online methods for finding the
best arm while correcting for adaptive bias include Goldenshluger and Zeevi (2013), Bas-
tani and Bayati (2015) and Nie et al. (2018), who suggest data-splitting by forced-sampling
of arms at prescribed times, and Dimakopoulou et al. (2018), who correct for the bias
via balancing and inverse probability weighting. Online methods to perform frequentist
statistical inference that is valid for bandits, but which avoid issues of explicitly bias-
correcting estimates of arm-specific expected rewards, are presented in Yang et al. (2017),
Jamieson and Jain (2018) and Ju et al. (2019).
Nevertheless, this paper has a different focus on inference compared to the previ-
ous literature. Broadly speaking, the above methods aim to either find the best arm or
learn without bias the expected reward associated with the best arm. In contrast, our goal
is to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of an action (exposure to advertising) that
is imperfectly obtained by pulling arms (bids). Therefore, in our setup, the target treat-
ment whose effect is to be learned is not an arm, but a shared stochastic outcome that
arises from pulling arms. Hence, arms are more appropriately thought of as instruments
for treatments, which makes our setup the online analogue of an offline encouragement
design from the program evaluation literature (see, for example, Imbens and Rubin, 1997).
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Our setup also shares similarities with the IV-bandit setup of Kallus (2018b), in which
there is a difference between the treatment-arm pulled and the treatment-arm applied due
to the possibility of user non-compliance. However, the difference between the pulled and
applied treatments, which is important to the design here, is not a feature of the design
considered by Kallus, because the pulled and applied treatments belong to the same set
in his design. Also, unlike Kallus’ setup, where exposure to a treatment is the outcome
of a choice by the user to comply with the pulled arm, exposure here is obtained via a
multi-agent game that is not directly affected by the user (auction), thus characterizing a
different exposure mechanism.
Bandits have been embedded explicitly within the structural causal framework of Pearl
(2009) in a series of recent papers by Bareinboim et al. (2015), Lattimore et al. (2016) and
Forney et al. (2017). Our paper is related to this stream as our application is a specific
instance of a structural causal model tailored to the auction setting: we assume the ex-
istence of a probabilistic generative process that is the common shared causal structure
behind the distributions of the rewards for each arm. As this stream has emphasized (for
a computational advertising example, see Bottou et al., 2013), the link to the model in
our application is helpful to making progress on the inference problem. This approach
has also been followed by other papers in economics (see, for example, the references
in Bergemann and Välimäki, 2008) and marketing (Misra et al., 2019) that study pricing
problems where firms aim to learn the optimal price from a grid of prices, corresponding
to arms, which share the same underlying demand function.
Finally, our approach is grounded in auction theory and also relates to bandits as
applied to RTB for digital advertising. In general, bandits and more general reinforcement
learning approaches have been used to learn optimal bidding policies (Cai et al., 2017;
Wang et al., 2017a; Wu et al., 2018; Jin et al., 2018), but not to estimate treatment effects. We
depart from these approaches in that our goal is to also perform causal inference. Further,
we achieve this goal by leveraging key properties of the auction format, thus contributing
to a nascent literature, to our knowledge, on direct applications of auction theory to enable
causal inference. While several studies combined experimentation with auction theory,
their goals were to identify optimal policies such as bids as in the aforementioned studies,
reserve prices (Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2014; Austin et al., 2016; Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2016;
Pouget-Abadie et al., 2018; Rhuggenaath et al., 2019) or auction formats (Chawla et al.,
2016), not to estimate the causal effect of an action determined by the auction.
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2 The ad display auction model
A risk neutral advertiser (she) participates in a second-price sealed-bid auction to display
her ad to a consumer (he). Her total expected payoff from the auction, in monetary units,
is given by:
p¯i(b|x) = Pr {BCP ≤ b|x} ×E [Y(1)− BCP|BCP ≤ b; x]
+ Pr {BCP > b|x} ×E [Y(0)|BCP > b; x] ,
(1)
where Y(1) is the payoff the advertiser receives if she wins the auction, Y(0) is the payoff
she receives if she loses, BCP is the highest bid against which she competes, b is the bid she
submits, and x is a variable that characterizes the auction and which can take p different
values, so that x ∈ X ≡ {x1, ..., xp}.1 The expectations in (1) are taken with respect not
only to BCP, as in standard auction models, but also to Y(1) and Y(0), and the advertiser’s
optimization problem is to maximize (1) with respect to b. Thus, we assume that the ad-
vertiser faces no inter-auction restrictions such as a budget constraint. To ensure that the
solution to this optimization problem is well-defined we maintain the following common
technical assumption regarding the joint distribution of {Y(1), Y(0), BCP} conditional on
x, which we denote by F(·, ·, ·|x).
Assumption 1.
(i) The joint distribution F(·, ·, ·|x) admits a continuous density, f (·, ·, ·|x), over R3+ for all x.
(ii) The density of BCP given x, fCP (·|x), is strictly positive in the interior of R+ for all x.
(iii) E [Y(1)|x] < ∞, E [Y(0)|x] < ∞, and E [BCP|x] < ∞ for all x.
In standard auction models the term Y(0) is set to zero. However, this convention is
not fitting to our setting given how we interpret the payoff terms Y(1) and Y(0). In par-
ticular, a consumer might have a baseline propensity to purchase the advertiser’s product
even if he is not exposed to her ad, which is associated with the term Y(0). Exposure to
the ad might affect this propensity, which implies that Y(1) 6= Y(0).
1In our MAB setup, x is the context to which the auction belongs. It can be obtained, for example, from
a vector Z of observable display opportunity variables that can include, for example, user and publisher
characteristics, with p being the total number of different combinations of values across all elements of Z.
This procedure is analogous to the segmentation of consumers in Misra et al. (2019).
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3 The advertiser’s dual objective
Standard auction theory models assume that the joint distribution F(·, ·, ·|·) is known, in
which case computing b∗(·) ≡ arg maxb p¯i(b|·) is straightforward, as is measuring the
heterogeneous expected effects of the ad, which is given by ATE(·) ≡ E [Y(1)−Y(0)|·].
However, in reality the advertiser has to collect data with information on F(·, ·, ·|·) to
estimate b∗(·) and ATE(·). Each observation i in these data is an ad display auction, and
for each i the advertiser observes a vector {Yi, Di, B¯CP,i, bi, xi}, where Di ≡ 1 {BCP,i ≤ bi},
Yi ≡ Di ×Yi(1) + (1− Di)×Yi(0) and B¯CP,i ≡ min {BCP,i, bi}. The structure of these data
is given in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Snapshot of data structure
i bi xi Di Yi Yi(1) Yi(0) B¯CP,i
1 b1 x1 1 y1 y1 − bCP,1
2 b2 x2 0 y2 − y2 b2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
Notice that these data suffer from two issues. The first is the “fundamental problem
of causal inference” (Holland, 1986): Y(1) and Y(0) are never observed at the same time.
The second is a censoring problem: BCP is only observed when the advertiser wins the
auction; otherwise, all she knows is that it was larger than the bid she submitted. Hence,
the observed data have a similar structure to the one in the model defined by Amemyia
(1984) as the Type 4 Tobit model.
Before proceeding to analyze the advertiser’s learning goals, we state the following
assumption, which we maintain throughout the analysis.
Assumption 2.
{Yi(1), Yi(0), BCP,i} iid∼ F(·, ·, ·|xi) and xi iid∼ Fx(·).
Assumption 2 imposes restrictions on the data generating process (DGP), which is
further illustrated in Figure 1. For instance, if the same consumer appeared more than
once and if his potential outcomes Y(1) and Y(0) were serially correlated, this condition
would not hold. In turn, if competing bidders solved a dynamic problem because of
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longer-term dependencies, budget or impression constraints, BCP could become serially
correlated as a result, in which case this condition would also be violated.
Advertiser
Nature
Auction
Data
x
b
{Y(1), Y(0), BCP, x}
{Y, D, B¯CP, b, x}
Figure 1: DGP
3.1 Economic goal
The advertiser’s economic goal is to learn b∗(·) from a sequence of auctions. A policy that
aims to achieve this goal should quickly learn b∗(·) while minimizing losses from occa-
sional sub-optimal bidding. Given Assumptions 1 and 2, b∗(x) is well-defined and com-
mon across auctions for every x, which implies that the advertiser’s economic goal lends
itself naturally to be represented as a contextual MAB problem.
In such setting, the advertiser considers a set of rx = 1, ..., Rx arms (so that we allow
the grid of arms to change across different contexts), each of which associated with a bid,
brx . The advertiser’s goal can be expressed as minimizing the expected regret from poten-
tially bidding sub-optimally over a sequence of auctions while learning b∗(·). Hence, we
implicitly assume that for each x the grid contains the optimal bid, b∗(x). Algorithms used
to solve MAB problems typically base the decision of which bid to play in round t, bt, on a
tradeoff between randomly picking a bid to obtain more information about its associated
payoff (exploration) and the information gathered until then on the optimality of each bid
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(exploitation). The existing information at the beginning of round t is a function of all
data collected until then, which we denote by It−1. Stacking the data presented in Table
1 across auctions for each round τ, we write It−1 = {bτ, xτ, Dτ, Yτ, B¯CP,τ,ωτ}t−1τ=1. The ωs
are seeds, independent from all other variables, required for randomization depending on
which algorithm is used.
Notice two points of departure between this setup and the usual MAB problem.
First, in the latter, each arm is associated with a different DGP, so it is commonly assumed
that the reward draws are independent across arms. In our setting, this is not true: given
the economic structure of the problem, conditional on x the values of {Y(1), Y(0), BCP} are
the same regardless of which arm is pulled, which creates correlation between rewards
across arms. Second, on pulling an arm we observe three different forms of feedback:
an indicator for whether we obtain treatment (ad-exposure), the highest competing bid
conditional on treatment, and the reward. This contrasts with the canonical case in which
the reward forms the only source of feedback.
3.2 Inference goal
The advertiser’s inference goal is to estimate ATE(·) from data. The main challenge in
achieving this goal is the missing data problem. A well-known solution to it would be for
the advertiser to randomize treatment, that is, ad-exposure. However, in this setting this
is not feasible since the treatment is determined by the outcome of the auction, which is
not under the advertiser’s complete control because she does not determine the highest
competing bid.
Nevertheless, the advertiser does have full control over her bids. Consequently, an
identification strategy to recover ATE(·) from data could make use of bid randomization.2
Notice that this generally is not sufficient to yield identification of ATE(·) if the relation-
ship between {Y(1), Y(0)} and BCP remains unrestricted. However, under the following
assumption bid randomization becomes equivalent to random ad-exposure, and there-
fore yields identification of ATE(·). We discuss this condition in more detail in the next
section.
Assumption 3.
{Y(1), Y(0)} ⊥ BCP|x.
2This has also been noted by Lewis and Wong (2018).
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4 Aligning the economic and inference goals
The two aforementioned goals are related as they both rely on learning the joint distribu-
tion F(·, ·, ·|·) from data. Nevertheless, common solutions to achieve one of these goals
often ignore the other one, creating a misalignment between the two.
First, consider the use of an algorithm to solve the MAB problem to learn b∗(·) and
assume that b∗(·) is such that the advertiser would almost always win by bidding opti-
mally. An efficient algorithm would quickly converge, eventually providing few auctions
in which D = 0, yielding few observations of Y(0), and making conventional estimates of
ATE(·) based on the data gathered via such algorithm imprecise.
Now assume that Assumption 3 holds and that the advertiser fully randomizes bids
to recover ATE(·). While many algorithms used to solve contextual MAB problems in-
volve bid randomization, the extent to which this is done is determined by an explicit ob-
jective of minimizing losses from sub-optimal decisions. Full bid randomization is likely
to yield considerably larger economic losses to the advertiser, which in many cases may
preclude its use altogether.
Despite seeming irreconcilable, we now demonstrate that, under Assumptions 1 and
3, the advertiser’s goals are actually perfectly aligned. We express this in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. If Assumptions 1 and 3 hold, b∗(x) = max {0, ATE(x)}.
Proof. To prove Proposition 1, we first rewrite equation (1):
p¯i(b|x) = Pr {BCP ≤ b|x}E [Y(1)− BCP|BCP ≤ b; x] + Pr {BCP > b|x}E [Y(0)|BCP > b; x]
= Pr {BCP ≤ b|x} {E [Y(1)−Y(0)|BCP ≤ b; x]−E [BCP|BCP ≤ b; x]}+E [Y(0)|x]
= Pr {BCP ≤ b|x} {E [Y(1)−Y(0)|x]−E [BCP|BCP ≤ b; x]}+E [Y(0)|x]
= Pr {BCP ≤ b|x} {ATE(x)−E [BCP|BCP ≤ b; x]}+E [Y(0)|x]
=
∫ b
0
[ATE(x)− u] fCP(u|x)du +E [Y(0)|x] , (2)
where the third equality follows from Assumption 3. Ignoring the term E [Y(0)|x] in
(2), which is without loss since it does not depend on b and thus has no impact on
the optimization problem, notice that p¯i(b|x) becomes a bidder’s expected payoff from
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a second-price sealed-bid auction in which this bidder’s private value equals ATE(x). Be-
cause the advertiser cannot submit negative bids, when ATE(x) ≤ 0 the optimal bid is
b(x) = 0 since the integrand is negative. Otherwise, notice that the integrand is non-
negative as long as b ≤ ATE(x), which implies that the optimal bid cannot be greater
than ATE(x). Because of Assumption 1, the density fCP(·|x) is strictly positive, so that
b∗(x) = ATE(x).
Proposition 1 is powerful because it implies that whenever displaying the auction is
beneficial, that is, when ATE(x) ≥ 0, the advertiser’s economic and inference goals are
perfectly aligned, as learning b∗(x) and estimating ATE(x) consist of the same task. The
usefulness of this result is that we obtain the object we would like to estimate and perform
inference on, ATE(x), as the identity of the best arm (that is, the best bid), rather than the
expected value of its reward. Since typical MAB algorithms recover the identify of the
best arm without bias, we are able to leverage them for inference on ad-effects without
bias in an online environment. In turn, when ad-exposure is detrimental (ATE(x) < 0) the
proposition converts this qualitative result into a clear economic policy as the advertiser
would have no interest in displaying the ad in the first place, which can be guaranteed by a
bid of zero. This result is obtained by exploiting the economic structure of the advertiser’s
problem, so the conditions for it to be true warrant further comments.
Assumption 3 is key. From an auction theory perspective, it is intuitive since it bears
a private values content: it implies that, conditional on x, knowledge of BCP has no ef-
fect on the bidder’s assessment of {Y(1), Y(0)}, and, consequently, on her assessment of
her willingness-to-pay (valuation). Assumption 2 is not required to establish Proposi-
tion 1, but it does justify framing the seller’s optimization problem as a contextual MAB.
If instead Y(1), Y(0) or BCP were serially correlated across auctions the advertiser’s dy-
namic problem would fit into a more general type of reinforcement learning problem. This
would also be the case if the advertiser faced inter-auction restrictions such as a budget
constraint, which we have ruled out by assumption. In turn, Assumption 1 not only is
mild but also relatively common in auction models and is made solely for tractability. The
requirement that fCP(·|x) is strictly positive in the interior ofR+ guarantees that the opti-
mal bid is unique, but is actually stronger than what is required to ensure uniqueness. A
sufficient condition is that fCP(·|x) is strictly positive on a neighborhood around ATE(x).
Finally, it is important to note that Proposition 1 generally holds for strategy-proof mech-
anisms, of which the second-price sealed-bid auction is just one example.3
3Other examples are ascending auctions, general Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms and
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5 Bidding Thompson Sampling (BTS) algorithm
We now propose a procedure to achieve the advertiser’s goals, which is a modified TS
algorithm. Since it aims to learn the advertiser’s optimal bid, we will refer to it as Bidding
Thompson Sampling (BTS).
5.1 General procedure
The TS algorithm (Thompson, 1933) is a Bayesian heuristic to solve MAB problems.4 TS
typically starts by parametrizing the distribution of rewards associated with each arm.
Since our problem departs from standard MAB problems in that the DGP behind each of
the arms − that is, the distribution F(·, ·, ·|·) − is the same, we choose to parametrize it
instead and denote our vector of parameters of interest by θ. Expected rewards depend
on θ, so we will often write p¯i(b|x, θ).
The algorithm runs while a criterion, ct, is below a threshold, T. After round t, the
prior over θ is updated by the likelihood of all data gathered by the end of round t, It.
We denote the number of observations gathered on round t by nt and the total number
of observations gathered by the end of round t by Nt = ∑tτ=1 nτ. If nt = 1 for all t the
algorithm proceeds auction by auction. We present it in this way to accommodate batch
updates. Given the posterior distribution of θ given It, we calculate
ψt(brx |x) ≡ Pr (arm rx is the best arm |It; x) (3)
and update the criterion ct. If the algorithm continues, on round t + 1 arm rx is pulled
for each observation with context x with probability ψt(brx |x); otherwise, the arm with
highest probability of being the optimal one, b∗t (x) ≡ arg maxb ψt(b|x), is identified as
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanisms.
4See Scott (2010) for an application to computational advertising and Russo et al. (2018) for an overview.
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such. The generic structure of the TS algorithm is outlined below.
Algorithm 1: Thompson Sampling
1 Set p(θ), ψ0(·|·), c0 and T.
while (ct < T) do
2 Pull arms according to ψt−1(·|·).
3 Combine new data with previously obtained data in It.
4 Update the posterior distribution of θ with It.
5 Compute ψt(·|·), ct and b∗t (·).
end
6 Identify b∗T(·) as optimal arm.
5.2 Parametrizing distribution of rewards
We now present the specific parametrization we use in our problem. Let Xi be the follow-
ing p−dimensional vector of mutually exclusive dummies:
Xi ≡
[
1 {xi = x1} ,1 {xi = x2} , ...,1
{
xi = xp
}]′ . (4)
Notice that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the vector Xi and the variable
x. Hence, we will use them interchangeably whenever it does not cause confusion. We
assume thatlog Yi(1)log Yi(0)
log BCP,i
 ∣∣∣Xi iid∼ N

 X
′
iδ1
X′iδ0
X′iδCP
 ,
 σ
2
1 ρσ1σ0 0
ρσ1σ0 σ
2
0 0
0 0 σ2CP

 ≡ N([ ∆′Xi
X′iδCP
]
,
[
Σ 0
0′ σ2CP
])
,
(5)
where ∆ ≡ [δ1, δ0], and collect the parameters in θ ≡
[
δ′1, δ
′
0, δ
′
CP, σ
2
1 , σ
2
0 , σ
2
CP, ρ
]′.
Notice that this parametrization directly imposes Assumption 3 and that since both
potential outcomes are never observed simultaneously, ρ is not point identified without
further restrictions.5 Also notice that (5) implies that ATE(Xi) = exp
{
X′iδ1 + 0.5σ
2
1
} −
exp
{
X′iδ0 + 0.5σ
2
0
}
. Hence, since our interest is in ATE(·) and since it does not depend
5However, it is possible to exploit the positive semidefiniteness of Σ to partially identify ρ. See, for
example, Vijverberg (1993) and Koop and Poirier (1997).
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on ρ, we explicitly assume that ρ = 0. This assumption has the benefit of significantly
simplifying the algorithm we present. A more general version that allows for ρ 6= 0 is
given in the Appendix. Furthermore, notice that (5) also implies that:
p¯i(b|Xi, θ) = Φ
(
log b− X′iδCP
σCP
)
× ATE(Xi)
−Φ
(
log b− X′iδCP
σCP
− σCP
)
× exp
{
X′iδCP + 0.5σ
2
CP
}
,
(6)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
and we omit the terms that do not depend on b for brevity. Finally, we do not allow the
matrix Σ to depend directly on Xi for simplicity. Nothing in our procedure precludes such
parametrization should the researcher prefer it.
5.3 Setting up priors using historical data
We choose independent normal-gamma priors, which are conjugate to the normal likeli-
hood induced by the DGP in (5). For k ∈ {1, 0, CP}, we set:
σ−2k ∼ Γ (αk, βk)
δk|σ2k ∼ N
(
µδk , σ
2
k A
−1
k
)
,
(7)
where {αk, βk}k∈{1,0,CP} are non-negative scalars,
{
µδk
}
k∈{1,0,CP} are p−dimensional vec-
tors and {Ak}k∈{1,0,CP} are p-by-p matrices. For the gamma distribution, the parametriza-
tion is such that if G ∼ Γ(α, β), then E[G] = α/β.
5.4 Drawing from posterior: Gibbs sampling
Implementing the algorithm requires computing updated probabilities, ψt(·|·), which can-
not be done analytically because of the missingness and censoring in the feedback data.
Nevertheless, it is still possible to exploit conditional conjugacy via data augmentation and
use the Gibbs sampling algorithm to obtain draws from the posterior distribution of θ
given It. Using these draws we can then estimate ψt(·|·) via Monte Carlo integration. We
now describe the steps of this estimation procedure, which combines the methods intro-
duced by Chib (1992) and Koop and Poirier (1997) in a single Gibbs sampling algorithm
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with data augmentation.
5.4.1 Data augmentation
The first step in our procedure is to draw the missing values from our data conditional on
(It, θ). We begin by drawing the missing values {log BCP,i}i:Di=0. Given (It, θ) and under
(5), it follows that:
log BmissCP,i
∣∣∣Di = 0, log Yi, log B¯CP,i, log bi, Xi, θ d=
log BmissCP,i
∣∣∣Di = 0, log bi, Xi, δCP, σ2CP ∼ TN (X′iδCP, σ2CP, log bi,+∞) , (8)
where d= means equality in distribution and TN
(
δ∗, σ2∗ , l, u
)
denotes the truncated normal
distribution with mean δ∗, variance σ2∗ , lower truncation at l and upper truncation at u.
Now we proceed to draw the missing values {log Yi(1)}i:Di=0 and {log Yi(0)}i:Di=1.
Given (It, θ) and under (5), it follows that:
log Ymissi (1)
∣∣∣Di = 0, log Yi, log B¯CP,i, log bi, Xi, θ d=
log Ymissi (1)
∣∣∣Di = 0, Xi, δ1, σ21 ∼ N (X′iδ1, σ21) (9)
and
log Ymissi (0)
∣∣∣Di = 1, log Yi, log B¯CP,i, log bi, Xi, θ d=
log Ymissi (0)
∣∣∣Di = 1, Xi, δ0, σ20 ∼ N (X′iδ0, σ20) . (10)
Defining
δmissi = Di × X′iδ0 ++(1− Di)× X′iδ1 (11)
and
σ2,missi = Diσ
2
0 + (1− Di)σ21 , (12)
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we can combine (9) and (10) into:
log Ymissi
∣∣∣ log Yi, Di, log B¯CP,i, log bi, Xi, θ d=
log Ymissi
∣∣∣Di, Xi, δ1, δ0, σ21 , σ20 ∼ N (δmissi , σ2,missi ) . (13)
5.4.2 Creating the “complete” data
Given a draw from the distributions given above,
{
log Ymissi , log B
miss
CP,i
}
, we can construct
the “complete” data:
log Y˜i(1) = Di log Yi + (1− Di) log Ymissi
log Y˜i(0) = Di log Ymissi + (1− Di) log Yi
log B˜CP,i = Di log B¯CP,i + (1− Di) log BmissCP,i .
(14)
5.4.3 Drawing from posterior distribution
The last step is to draw new parameters from their full conditional distributions. Collect
the parameters of the priors in θprior ≡
{
µδk , Ak, αk, βk
}
k∈{1,0,CP}. For ease of notation,
we stack all the “complete” data by the end of round t in the following Nt-by-1 vectors:
log Y˜t(1), log Y˜t(0), log B˜CP,t, Dt and log bt. We also use the Nt-by-p matrix Xt, whose ith
row is the vector X′i , and collect them all in I˜t ≡
[
log Y˜t(1), log Y˜t(0), log B˜CP,t log bt, Dt, Xt
]
.
Finally, let θ(q−1) =
[
δ
′(q−1)
1 , δ
′(q−1)
0 , δ
′(q−1)
CP , σ
2,(q−1)
1 , σ
2,(q−1)
0 , σ
2,(q−1)
CP
]′
be the (q − 1)-th
draw of the vector of parameters. Given the structure of the model, it then follows that
the full conditional distributions of the parameters simplify in the following way:
σ
2,(q)
CP
∣∣∣θ(q−1), θprior, I˜t d= σ2,(q)CP ∣∣∣ log B˜CP,t, Xt, µδCP , ACP, αCP, βCP
σ
2,(q)
1
∣∣∣θ(q−1), θprior, I˜t d= σ2,(q)1 ∣∣∣ log Y˜t(1), Xt, µδ1 , A1, α1, β1
σ
2,(q)
0
∣∣∣θ(q−1), θprior, I˜t d= σ2,(q)0 ∣∣∣ log Y˜t(0), Xt, µδ0 , A0, α0, β0
(15)
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and, letting σ2,(q) ≡
[
σ
2,(q)
1 , σ
2,(q)
0 , σ
2,(q)
CP
]′
,
δ
(q)
CP
∣∣∣σ2,(q), δ(q−1)1 , δ(q−1)0 , δ(q−1)CP , θprior, I˜t d= δ(q)CP∣∣∣σ2,(q)CP log B˜CP,t, Xt, µδCP , ACP
δ
(q)
1
∣∣∣σ2,(q), δ(q−1)1 , δ(q−1)0 , δ(q−1)CP , θprior, I˜t d= δ(q)1 ∣∣∣σ2,(q)1 log Y˜t(1), Xt, µδ1 , A1
δ
(q)
0
∣∣∣σ2,(q), δ(q−1)1 , δ(q−1)0 , δ(q−1)CP , θprior, I˜t d= δ(q)0 ∣∣∣σ2,(q)0 log Y˜t(0), Xt, µδ0 , A0.
(16)
For completeness, because of the parametric forms in (5) and (7), we have that:
σ
−2,(q)
CP
∣∣∣ log B˜CP,t, Xt, µδCP , ACP, αCP, βCP
∼ Γ
(
αCP +
Nt
2
, βCP +
1
2
[(
log B˜CP,t − XtδˆCP,t
)′ (
log B˜CP,t − XtδˆCP,t
)
+
(
δˆCP,t − µδCP
)′
X′tXt
(
ACP + X′tXt
)−1 ACP (δˆCP,t − µδCP)])
σ
−2,(q)
1
∣∣∣ log Y˜t(1), Xt, µδ1 , A1, α1, β1
∼ Γ
(
α1 +
Nt
2
, β1 +
1
2
[(
log Y˜t(1)− Xtδˆ1,t
)′ (
log Y˜t(1)− Xtδˆ1,t
)
+
(
δˆ1,t − µδ1
)′
X′tXt
(
A1 + X′tXt
)−1 A1 (δˆ1,t − µδ1)])
σ
−2,(q)
0
∣∣∣ log Y˜t(0), Xt, µδ0 , A0, α0, β0
∼ Γ
(
α0 +
Nt
2
, β0 +
1
2
[(
log Y˜t(0)− Xtδˆ0,t
)′ (
log Y˜t(0)− Xtδˆ0,t
)
+
(
δˆ0,t − µδ0
)′
X′tXt
(
A0 + X′tXt
)−1 A0 (δˆ0,t − µδ0)]) ,
(17)
where
δˆCP,t =
(
X′tXt
)−1 X′t log B˜CP,t
δˆ1,t =
(
X′tXt
)−1 X′t log Y˜t(1)
δˆ0,t =
(
X′tXt
)−1 X′t log Y˜t(0),
(18)
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and
δ
(q)
CP
∣∣∣σ2,(q)CP log B˜CP,t, Xt, µδCP , ACP
∼ N
((
ACP + X′tXt
)−1 (X′t log B˜CP,t + ACPµδCP) , σ2CP (ACP + X′tXt)−1)
δ
(q)
1
∣∣∣σ2,(q)1 log Y˜t(1), Xt, µδ1 , A1
∼ N
((
A1 + X′tXt
)−1 (X′t log Y˜t(1) + A1µδ1) , σ21 (A1 + X′tXt)−1)
δ
(q)
0
∣∣∣σ2,(q)0 log Y˜t(0), Xt, µδ0 , A0
∼ N
((
A0 + X′tXt
)−1 (X′t log Y˜t(0) + A0µδ0) , σ20 (A0 + X′tXt)−1) .
(19)
5.4.4 Summary
The entire Gibbs sampling procedure is summarized below. If one wishes to allow for
ρ 6= 0 the procedure has to be adjusted. We present this more general algorithm in the
Appendix.
Algorithm 2: Gibbs sampling
1 Set θ(0) and θprior.
for (q = 1, ..., Q) do
2 Draw
{
log Ymiss,(q)i (1), log Y
miss,(q)
i (0), log B
miss,(q)
CP,i
}Nt
i=1
according to (8)−(13).
3 Construct
{
log Y˜(q)i (1), log Y˜
(q)
i (0), log B˜
(q)
CP,i
}Nt
i=1
according to (14).
4 Draw θ(q) according to (15)−(19).
end
5.5 Estimating optimality probability of each arm
For each draw θ(q), context x and arm brx , we can compute p¯i(brx |x, θ(q)) via equation (6).
The probabilities can then be estimated by averaging over the Q draws:
ψˆt(brx |x) =
1
Q
Q
∑
q=1
1
{
p¯i
(
brx
∣∣∣x, θ(q)) > p¯i (br′x ∣∣∣x, θ(q)) for all r′x 6= rx} . (20)
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5.6 Stopping the TS
The simplest stopping rule is to specify the total number of rounds the algorithm has to
run through, in which case ct = t and T is some exogenous threshold. However, the
data collected through the algorithm can help inform the decision of when to stop the
experiment. We propose a stopping rule that follows this approach. We first motivate it in
a non-contextual setting to provide intuition, and then generalize it to the more complex
contextual case we have presented above. We then discuss the implications of using a
data-based stopping rule for Bayesian inference.
5.6.1 Non-contextual case
Consider first a non-contextual MAB problem, that is, x takes one given value with prob-
ability one. Thus, we omit x for the remaining of this section to ease notation. The al-
gorithm aims to identify the best arm while minimizing the costs of experimentation.
Hence, we propose a stopping rule based on the confidence with which the optimal arm
was found. More precisely, we set T = 0.95 and
ct = maxr ψˆt(br), (21)
which can be interpreted as a decision to stop when the posterior distribution of θ given It
leads us to believe that the arm with current highest probability of being the optimal arm
is the true best arm with at least 95% probability.
This stopping rule also has a well-defined interpretation in terms of Bayes factors,
which are often used for Bayesian hypothesis testing. Let ζt(br) be the posterior odds ratio
of arm r being the optimal arm by the end of round t. Then,
ζt(br) =
Prt(br is the optimal bid)
Prt(br is not the optimal bid)
=
Prt(br is the optimal bid)
1− Prt(br is the optimal bid)
=
ψt(br)
1− ψt(br) . (22)
Thus, ct can alternatively be constructed as maxr ζˆt(br), with corresponding threshold
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T = 19, so that stopping is based off a threshold on the implied Bayes factor.6
5.6.2 Contextual case
Having provided the motivation behind our proposed stopping criterion, we now proceed
to adapt it to the contextual MAB problem. This is a more complex problem because now
there is not a single best arm, but p best arms. Thus, a natural but conservative approach
would be to require 95% posterior probability over a list of p arms as being the optimal
ones. In this case, the threshold rule can be expressed by:
ct = min
x∈X
max
rx
ψˆt(brx |x), (23)
while maintaining the requirement that ct > T = 0.95. Consequently, upon stoppage
there would be at least 95% posterior probability on a given b∗(x) for each x.
In some scenarios it is arguably the case that the advertiser’s inference objective is to
estimate and perform inference on the unconditional ATE. Under these circumstances, the
stopping rule above is likely to be too stringent since the goal is not to learn every ATE(x)
with high probability, but just ATE. Hence, we now present a slightly less demanding
approach.
Recall that for each context x we consider Rx different arms. Consequently, the un-
conditional ATE can take at most R ≡ ∏p`=1 Rx` values as ATE = ∑
p
`=1 Fx(x`)× ATE(x`).
Consider a grid with the S unique values among these R, which we denote as for s =
1, ..., S. Our criterion is to stop when at least 95% of the Q draws from the posterior imply
that the ATE is equal to one of the as values in the grid.
To make this criterion precise, notice that, at the end of round t, for each θ(q) and
context x, there is an arm that maximizes p¯i
(
·
∣∣∣x, θ(q)). In turn, the bid associated with
such arm is equal to ATE(x) by Proposition 1.7 Denote this value by ATE(q)t (x). It is
straightforward to then compute ATE(q)t = ∑
p
`=1 Fx(x`) × ATE
(q)
t (x`). Our criterion is
6It is important to emphasize that following this stopping rule is not equivalent to conducting a se-
quential Bayesian hypothesis test. Such procedure would require us to establish a null hypothesis that one
specific arm was the best, and base the decision to stop solely on this arm’s Bayes factor or posterior odds
ratio. Instead, we remain agnostic as to which arm is the best, and base our decision to stop on which arm
has strongest evidence on its support.
7Hence, we implicitly assume that all the CATEs are non-negative; otherwise, the resulting estimate of
the ATE should be seen as an upper bound of the true ATE.
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then given by:
ct = max
s∈{1,...,S}
1
Q
Q
∑
q=1
1
{
ATE(q)t = as
}
. (24)
Notice that while our decision rule depends on the confidence with which we believe
to have found the true unconditional ATE as implied by the posterior distribution of θ
given It, traffic is still allocated to each arm according to (20). Hence, the decision to stop
the experiment is aligned with the advertiser’s inference goal, while the way it performs
randomization is aligned with her economic goal. Finally, note that this stopping criterion
presupposes that the distribution from which contexts are drawn, Fx(·), is known to the
researcher. When this is not the case, one could replace it with empirical frequencies
estimated using data collected via the algorithm, with the slight added difficulty that the
grid of unique S values ATEt can take now will potentially change round by round. While
we expect the stopping rule given in (24) to shorten the duration of the experiment when
compared to the one given in (23), we found in simulations that the difference between
these two rules is minimal.
5.6.3 Implications for Bayesian inference
It is important to mention that the question of how to stop an experiment while conduct-
ing Bayesian inference is still an open issue. Even though data-based stopping rules are
known to interfere with frequentist inference, which motivated the development of new
methods to explicitly account for this interference both for non-adaptive (Johari et al.,
2016) and adaptive (Yang et al., 2017; Jamieson and Jain, 2018; Ju et al., 2019) data collec-
tion procedures, Bayesian inference has historically been viewed as immune to optional
stopping rules (Lindley, 1957; Edwards et al., 1963; Savage, 1972; Good, 1991). Neverthe-
less, a recent debate has emerged concerning what are the effects of optional stopping on
frequentist properties and interpretation of Bayes estimators (Yu et al., 2014; Sanborn and
Hills, 2014; Rouder, 2014; Dienes, 2016; Deng et al., 2016; Schönbrodt et al., 2017; Hendrik-
sen et al., 2018; de Heide and Grünwald, 2018; Wagenmakers et al., 2019; Rouder, 2019).
We do not attempt to resolve this debate in this paper. Instead, we present simulations
that show its practical impact is minimal in our setting.
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5.7 Practical considerations
5.7.1 Expected regret minimization versus best arm identification
We set up the problem in an expected regret minimization framework based on the view-
point that the advertiser seeks to maximize his payoffs from bidding during the exper-
iment. We could alternatively cast the problem as one of pure best arm identification
(Bubeck et al., 2009).8 To leverage Proposition 1, all we need is a bandit framework to
recover the arm with largest expected reward, so the core idea behind the approach ports
to that situation as well.
5.7.2 Parametric assumptions
More flexible parametric specifications can be used instead of (5) and (7) if the researcher is
willing to employ more complex MCMC methods, which we expect to be slower than the
Gibbs sampling algorithm presented above. This is because conditional conjugacy is likely
to fail under alternative parametrizations. However, any algorithm with convergence
guarantees (e.g., UCB, e-greedy) could in theory be used instead of the TS algorithm if the
practitioner is not comfortable with making specific distributional assumptions, which are
not required for these other methods.
5.7.3 Obtaining draws from posterior distribution
The method we presented requires the researcher to employ Gibbs sampling on an increas-
ing data set every round, which becomes slower as the number of observations increases.
We note that Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) methods could instead be used to speed up
the sampling.9
8For an example of a study that adopts this approach to identify an optimal policy see Kasy and Saut-
mann (2019).
9For an application of SMC methods to MAB problems, see Cherkassky and Bornn (2013).
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5.7.4 Using additional data on competing bids
We also note that it is straightforward to adapt the procedure depending on which auction
data are made available. We have assumed that the advertiser only observes BCP when
she effectively has to pay this amount; otherwise, all she knows is that it is bounded below
by b. If the transaction price from the auction is made public, the advertiser obtains a more
precise lower bound whenever it is larger than b. This yields a new definition of B¯CP and
does not require any modification of the procedure. However, if BCP itself is made public
the algorithm simplifies since the censoring problem vanishes. Hence, the practitioner can
update the posterior distribution over the parameters δCP and σ2CP analytically, without
the need to use the Gibbs sampling procedure introduced by Chib (1992), because of the
exact conjugacy implied by (5) and (7).
5.7.5 Addressing the cold start problem
While priors always play an important role in Bayesian inference, they can become even
more important in the context of experimentation as a way to deal with the cold start prob-
lem. Well-informed priors might situate the algorithm at a good starting point, shortening
the duration of the experiment and, consequently, decreasing its cots. On the other hand,
poorly specified priors might have the opposite effect and become inferior even to dif-
fuse, non-informative priors. Hence, we now propose an approach that uses past data to
inform the choice of the parameters
{
µδk , Ak, αk, βk
}
k∈{1,0,CP}.
10 Throughout this section,
we assume that the researcher has access to a data set In = {bi, Xi, Di, Yi, B¯CP,i}ni=1.
Our approach is based on equating the means and variances of the prior distri-
butions to the approximate means and variances of estimators of δ1, δ0, δCP and σ2 ≡[
σ21 , σ
2
0 , σ
2
CP
]′. Since we employ maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs), which in this
10Feit and Berman (2019) also estimate priors from historical data.
23
case are
√
n−consistent and asymptotically normal, our approach sets, for k ∈ {1, 0, CP},
αk
βk
= σˆ−2k
αk
β2k
=
1
n
ˆAvar
[√
n
(
σˆ−2k − σ−2k
)]
=
σˆ8k
n
ˆAvar
[√
n
(
σˆ2k − σ2k
)]
µδk = δˆk
Ak = nσˆ2k
{ ˆAvar [√n (δˆk − δk)]}−1 .
(25)
Notice that for the parameters of the Gamma distributions this is equivalent to:
αk = nσˆ−4k
{
ˆAvar
[√
n
(
σˆ−2k − σ−2k
)]}−1
= nσˆ4k
{
ˆAvar
[√
n
(
σˆ2k − σ2k
)]}−1
βk = nσˆ−2k
{
ˆAvar
[√
n
(
σˆ−2k − σ−2k
)]}−1
= nσˆ6k
{
ˆAvar
[√
n
(
σˆ2k − σ2k
)]}−1
.
(26)
For the purposes of estimation we assume that Di ⊥ Yi(1), Yi(0)|Xi. Because of
Assumption 3, the only potential source of dependence between Di and the potential out-
comes is bi. This is not a concern when the algorithm is implemented since the bids bi
are under the control of the researcher. If the historical data come from an experiment
in which bids were randomized, this condition is also satisfied.11 However, we note that
the algorithm will consistently recover the true CATEs even if this assumption is violated
and the resulting priors are poorly specified. We provide details about the estimators and
their computation in the Appendix.
6 Simulations
To illustrate our method we perform a series of simulations. We consider a setting with
two equiprobable contexts and set δ1 ≈ [0.81, 1.25]′, δ0 = [0.2, 0.45]′, δCP = [0.25, 0.4]′,
σ21 = 0.36, σ
2
0 = 0.64, σ
2
CP = 0.25 and ρ = 0, so that b
∗(x1) = ATE(x1) = 1, b∗(x2) =
ATE(x2) = 2 and ATE = 1.5.
A simple way to estimate the ATEs would be to perform a non-adaptive experiment
in which users are randomly exposed to the ad, which we refer to as an “A/B test”. This is
not possible in RTB since the advertiser does not fully control the ad delivery mechanism.
11Hence, Assumption 3 can also be seen as a version of unconfoundedness (also known as conditional
independence and selection on observables) from the econometrics and statistics literatures.
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However, by randomly picking arbitrarily high and low bids the advertiser can virtually
guarantee to win or lose the auction, thereby obtaining random ad-exposure. We equate
these high and low bids to 20 and 0.01 for both contexts and consider three randomization
scenarios: Pr(D = 1) = Pr(b = 20) ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}. Figure 2a plots the expected
regret per round of each of these randomization policies over a sequence of 100 rounds of
bidding, which is the expected profit from equiprobably bidding 20 or 0.01. Since these
strategies are non-adaptive, the expected regret per round is constant.
We then consider a MAB, with bids {0.5, 1.0, 1.5} for context x1 and {1, 2, 3} for con-
text x2. We run 1,000 simulations using our BTS algorithm, each of which for 100 rounds
with 50 new auctions per round, so that nt = 50, 1 ≤ t ≤ 100. We set the following pa-
rameters for the priors:
{
µδk = Ak = αk = βk = 0
}
k∈{1,0,CP}. The Gibbs sampling always
started at the values {δk = 0}k∈{1,0,CP} and
{
σ2k = 1
}
k∈{1,0,CP}, and the initial optimality
probabilities were set to ψ0(b|x1) = 1/3 for b ∈ {0.5, 1.0, 1.5} and ψ0(b|x2) = 1/3 for
b ∈ {1, 2, 3}. On each round, we drew 1,000 vectors of parameters from the posterior
distribution, dropped the first 250 and used the remaining 750 to estimate ψt(·|·).
To compare this approach to the simpler non-adaptive experimentation policies, we
also display in Figure 2a boxplots with the interquartiles of expected regret from the BTS
algorithm for each round across the 1,000 simulations. That is, at the end of round t we
compute the expected profit from bidding according to the probabilities ψˆt(·|·), which we
denote by p¯it(·), and subtract it from p¯i(b∗) = ∑2`=1 Fx(x`) × p¯i (b∗(x`)|x`). The results
show that the BTS algorithm dominates the simpler randomization policies in terms of
expected regret per round.
The fact that the expected regret per round from the BTS algorithm tends to zero sug-
gests that this method succeeds in identifying the true best arm. To better illustrate this,
Figure 2b displays boxplots with the interquartiles of Pˆr(ATEt = ATE) across the 1,000
simulations. Results show that as the algorithm progresses and data are accumulated, the
interquartile plots uniformly converge to 1, demonstrating that our method succeeds in
identifying the true ATEs in practice.
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Figure 2: Comparing BTS to A/B tests: interquartiles over 100 rounds across 1,000 simu-
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The comparison between the BTS algorithm and the extreme A/B tests described
above might stack the deck in favor of the MAB approach. To address this concern we
recreate Figure 2a but this time comparing the MAB approach to an A/B test implemented
on the same grid of bids considered by the BTS algorithm, that is, one in which each of
three bids from the grids is chosen with equal probability. We display the results in Figure
2c. Despite being less drastic, they still show that the BTS algorithm dominates the non-
adaptive randomization policy in terms of expected regret per round.
The dominance of the BTS algorithm over the A/B test on the grid of bids is more
intense if we consider the evolution of cumulative expected regret, which is given by t×
p¯i(b∗) − ∑tτ=1 p¯iτ(·), instead of expected regret per round. This is a relevant quantity in
situations where the advertiser has a fixed amount to spend on an experiment and wishes
to obtain as much data as possible with this amount. We thus replicate Figure 2c but
displaying the cumulative expected regret over a sequence of 100 rounds across the 1,000
simulations. Figure 2d shows that the MAB approach allows the advertiser to collect
more data than a non-adaptive randomization policy, which is arguably desirable for the
purposes of accomplishing her dual objective.
The aforementioned results ignore the stopping rule we introduced in section 5.6.
Figure 2b showed that Pˆr(ATEt = ATE) always converged to one as the algorithm pro-
gressed. However, our proposed stopping rule stipulates that the algorithm should stop
once at least 95% of the posterior optimality probability concentrated on any of the pos-
sible values ATEt can take, which would then be identified as the true ATE. Thus, the
relevant question is twofold: first, would the algorithm indeed have stopped before the
hundredth round had the stopping rule been applied, and second, would it have correctly
identified the true ATE when it stopped.
Over the 1,000 simulations, the algorithm would have stopped before the hundredth
round in all but 54 times and would have identified the true ATE upon stoppage in 97.57%
of such cases. Figure 3 presents a histogram of the stopping times associated with the sim-
ulations from Figure 2 that would have stopped before the hundredth round had the stop-
ping rule from section 5.6 been used. Stopping times associated with correct identification
of the true ATE are displayed in blue, while the ones associated with mistakes are shown
in red. Results show that the algorithm is much more likely to make a mistake when it
stops at very early stages: more than 50% of mistakes happened when the algorithm ran
for at most 21 rounds, while the minimum amount it needed to correctly identify the true
ATE at stoppage was 22. Hence, in practice we suggest incorporating into the stopping
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Figure 3: Histogram of stopping times across simulations with early stoppage
rule a restriction that the algorithm runs for a minimum number of rounds.
7 Concluding remarks
An online algorithm for obtaining causal inference on RTB advertising is presented.
The algorithm leverages the theory of optimal bidding under second-price sealed-bid auc-
tions to align the twin goals of obtaining economic payoff maximization and inference on
the expected effect of advertising. The algorithm is implemented as a modified TS that
is adaptively updated via MCMC. The second-price sealed-bid auction environment is
the most popular auction format for RTB ads (see, e.g., Choi et al., 2017). Extensions to
more complex auction environments (e.g., first-price sealed-bid auctions) can make the in-
ference problem more challenging. As mentioned before, allowing for contexts will make
Assumption 3 more viable by leveraging a conditional independence assumption. Logged
historical data can be used to develop data-driven priors and solve the cold-start problem.
These extensions are being pursued in our future work as part of the implementation of
the algorithm on the advertising platform of JD.com.
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Appendix
A Maximum likelihood estimators used on historical data
This section describes in more detail the maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs) we use
to choose the parameters of the prior distributions. The assumptions we make on the
historical data are the same as the ones discussed in section 5.3.
A.1 Potential outcomes
We begin by describing how we use historical data to pick the parameters for the prior
distributions associated with the potential outcomes. Because we are maintaining the
assumption that Di ⊥ Yi(1), Yi(0)
∣∣Xi, we can simply use OLS on historical data to pick
the parameters since it is equivalent to the MLE. In particular, define Xi1 ≡ DiXi. It follows
that:
δˆ1 =
(
1
n
n
∑
i=1
Xi1X′i1
)−1(
1
n
n
∑
i=1
Xi1 log Yi
)
,
σˆ21 =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
(
log Yi − X′i1δˆ1
)2
and
√
n
[
δˆ1 − δ1
σˆ21 − σ21
]
d−→ N
([
0
0
]
,
[
σ21
(
E
[
Xi1X′i1
])−1 0
0′ 2σ21
])
.
Hence,
ˆAvar
[√
n
(
δˆ1 − δ1
)]
= σˆ21
(
1
n
n
∑
i=1
Xi1X′i1
)−1
and
ˆAvar
[√
n
(
σˆ21 − σ21
)]
= 2σˆ41 .
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The estimators δˆ0 and σˆ20 are analogous to the ones above, with Xi0 ≡ (1−Di)Xi replacing
Xi1, so we omit them for brevity.
A.2 Highest competing bid
Even though we maintain the assumption of treatment exogeneity, we still have to ac-
count for censoring of the highest competing bid. Given the normality assumption, the
censoring characterizes a standard Tobit model. To make its MLE more computationally
manageable, we first reparametrize the model so that the log-likelihood function becomes
globally concave as first shown by Olsen (1978). Let ℵCP ≡ σ−1CPδCP and iCP ≡ σ−1CP . The
log-likelihood of the data is then given by:
log L (In|ℵCP,iCP) = 1n
n
∑
i=1
{
Di log
[
iCPφ
(
iCP log bCP,i − X′iℵCP
)]
+ (1− Di) log
[
Φ
(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
)]}
,
where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the pdf and cdf of the standard normal distribution, respectively.
We use the Newton-Raphson algorithm to compute the estimator. This requires us
to compute the first and second derivatives of the log-likelihood function. We have that:
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∂ log L
∂ℵCP =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
{
Di
(
iCP log bCP,i − X′iℵCP
)
+ (1− Di)
φ
(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
)
Φ
(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
)}Xi
∂ log L
∂iCP
=
1
n
n
∑
i=1
{
Di
[
1
iCP
− log bCP,i
(
iCP log bCP,i − X′iℵCP
)]
− (1− Di)
φ
(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
)
Φ
(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
) log bi
}
∂2 log L
∂ℵCP∂ℵ′CP
= − 1
n
n
∑
i=1
{
Di − (1− Di)
φ
(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
)
Φ
(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
)
×
[(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
)− φ (X′iℵCP −iCP log bi)
Φ
(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
)]}XiX′i
∂2 log L
∂ℵCP∂iCP =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
{
Di log bCP,i + (1− Di)
φ
(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
)
Φ
(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
)
×
[(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
)− φ (X′iℵCP −iCP log bi)
Φ
(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
)] log bi
}
Xi
∂2 log L
∂i2CP
= − 1
n
n
∑
i=1
{
Di
(
1
i2CP
+ (log bCP,i)
2
)
− (1− Di)
φ
(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
)
Φ
(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
)
×
[(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
)− φ (X′iℵCP −iCP log bi)
Φ
(
X′iℵCP −iCP log bi
)] (log bi)2
}
.
Letting
H (ℵCP,iCP) =
 ∂2 log L(ℵCP,iCP)∂ℵCP∂ℵ′CP ∂2 log L(ℵCP,iCP)∂ℵCP∂iCP
∂2 log L(ℵCP,iCP)
∂ℵ′CP∂iCP
∂2 log L(ℵCP,iCP)
∂i2CP
 ,
it then follows that
√
n
[
ℵˆCP − ℵCP
iˆCP −iCP
]
d−→ N
(
0,−plim
n→∞
[
H
(
ℵˆCP, iˆCP
)−1])
.
To convert the parameters back to the original ones, we make use of the delta method.
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We have that:
g (ℵCP,iCP) =
[
i−1CPℵCP
i−2CP
]
,
which implies that
∇g (ℵCP,iCP) =
[
∂g(ℵCP,iCP)
∂ℵ′CP
∂g(ℵCP,iCP)
∂iCP
]
=
[
i−1CP Ip −i−2CPℵCP
0 −2i−3CP
]
,
where Ip is the identity matrix with dimension p. Thus, by the delta method:
√
n
[
δˆCP − δCP
σˆ2CP − σ2CP
]
d−→ N
(
0,−plim
n→∞
[
∇g
(
ℵˆCP, iˆCP
)
H
(
ℵˆCP, iˆCP
)−1∇g (ℵˆCP, iˆCP)′]) .
Finally, ˆAvar
[√
n
(
δˆCP − δCP
)]
and ˆAvar
[√
n
(
σˆ2CP − σ2CP
)]
are obtained by picking the
block diagonal elements of the matrix
−∇g
(
ℵˆCP, iˆCP
)
H
(
ℵˆCP, iˆCP
)−1∇g (ℵˆCP, iˆCP)′ .
B Gibbs sampling when potential outcomes are correlated
We now present a more general Gibbs sampling that accommodates the possibility that
ρ 6= 0. When ρ 6= 0, the missing values log Ymissi depend on the observed values log Yi
even conditional on Di, which requires us to change the priors and the procedure ac-
cordingly. To do so, we combine the Bayesian estimator for the standard Tobit model
introduced by Chib (1992) and the approach to estimate the parameters in a seemingly
unrelated regressions (SUR) model where all equations have the same set of regressors
with data augmentation in a single Gibbs sampling algorithm.12 We now present these
adaptations in detail.
12See section 2.8.5 of Rossi et al. (2005) and section 14.11 of Koop et al. (2007) for more details.
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B.1 Prior distributions
For k ∈ {1, 0} we replace (7) with
Σ−1 ≡
[
σ21 ρσ1σ0
ρσ1σ0 σ
2
0
]−1
∼ W
(
ν,Ξ−1
)
δ ≡ vec(∆) =
[
δ1
δ0
]
∼ N
(
µδ,Σ⊗ A−1δ
) (B.1)
where W (·, ·) denotes the Wishart distribution, ν is a non-negative scalar, Ξ is a 2-by-2
matrix, µδ =
[
µ′δ1 , µ
′
δ0
]′
is a 2p-by-1 vector and Aδ is a p-by-p matrix.13 We will also use
the following p-by-2 matrix: Mδ ≡
[
µδ1 , µδ0
]
.
B.2 Distributions of missing values, data augmentation and completion
Instead of (9) and (10) it now follows that:
log Ymissi (1)
∣∣∣Di = 0, log Yi, log B¯CP,i, log bi, Xi, θ d=
log Ymissi (1)
∣∣∣Di = 0, log Yi, Xi, δ,Σ ∼ N (X′iδ1 + ρσ1σ0 (log Yi − X′iδ0) ,
(
1− ρ2
)
σ21
)
(B.2)
and
log Ymissi (0)
∣∣∣Di = 1, log Yi, log B¯CP,i, log bi, Xi, θ d=
log Ymissi (0)
∣∣∣Di = 1, log Yi, Xi, δ,Σ ∼ N (X′iδ0 + ρσ0σ1 (log Yi − X′iδ1) ,
(
1− ρ2
)
σ20
)
,
(B.3)
while (8) remains the same. We can redefine δmissi and σ
2,miss
i as
δmissi = Di
(
X′iδ0 +
ρσ0
σ1
(
log Yi − X′iδ1
))
+ (1− Di)
(
X′iδ1 +
ρσ1
σ0
(
log Yi − X′iδ0
))
(B.4)
13We maintain independent priors for the parameters associated with {Y(1), Y(0)} and BCP because of
Assumption 3. Should this assumption be relaxed, we could then express (7) including δCP into δ and ∆ and
the same for σ2CP and the correlations between log BCP and log Y(1) and log Y(0) into the matrix Σ.
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and
σ2,missi =
(
1− ρ2
) [
Diσ20 + (1− Di)σ21
]
, (B.5)
respectively, and combine them into
log Ymissi
∣∣∣ log Yi, Di, Xi, δ,Σ ∼ N (δmissi , σ2,missi ) . (B.6)
The completion process in (14) remains unchanged.
B.3 Drawing from posterior distribution
We once again condition on the “completed” data, I˜t, and on the parameters of the prior
distributions, which now are given by θprior ≡
{
µδ, Aδ, ν,Ξ, µδCP , ACP, αCP, βCP
}
. In ad-
dition to the previously defined objects, we will also use the following Nt-by-2 matrix,
log Y˜PO,t ≡
[
log Y˜t(1), log Y˜t(0)
]
, as well as
∆˜t =
(
X′tXt + Aδ
)−1 (X′t log Y˜PO,t + AδMδ) (B.7)
and
SSRt =
(
log Y˜PO,t − Xt∆˜t
)′ (log Y˜PO,t − Xt∆˜t)+ (∆˜t −Mδ)′ Aδ (∆˜t −Mδ) . (B.8)
To draw new values for σ2CP and δCP we still utilize expressions (17) and (19). How-
ever, instead of using these expressions to draw new values for Σ and δ, we now leverage
the following results:
Σ−1,(q)
∣∣∣θ(q−1), θprior, I˜t d= Σ−1,(q)∣∣∣ log Y˜PO,t, Xt, ν,Ξ, µδ, Aδ (B.9)
and
δ(q)
∣∣∣Σ(q), σ2,(q)CP , δ(q−1), δ(q−1)CP , θprior, I˜t d= δ(q)∣∣∣Σ(q), log Y˜PO,t, Xt, µδ, Aδ. (B.10)
For completeness, given the parametric assumptions we made it follows that:
Σ−1,(q)
∣∣∣ log Y˜PO,t, Xt, ν,Ξ, µδ, Aδ ∼ W (ν+ Nt, (Ξ+ SSRt)−1) (B.11)
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and
δ(q)
∣∣∣Σ(q), log Y˜PO,t, Xt, µδ, Aδ ∼ N (vec (∆˜t) ,Σ(q) ⊗ (X′tXt + Aδ)−1) . (B.12)
B.4 Summary
We summarize this adapted Gibbs sampling procedure below.
Algorithm 3: Gibbs sampling when ρ 6= 0
1 Set
{
δ(0), δ(0)CP ,Σ
(0), σ2,(0)CP , µδ, Aδ, ν,Ξ, µδCP , ACP, αCP, βCP
}
.
for (q = 1, ..., Q) do
2 Draw
{
log Ymiss,(q)i (1), log Y
miss,(q)
i (0), log B
miss,(q)
CP,i
}Nt
i=1
using (8) and
(B.2)−(B.6).
3 Construct
{
log Y˜(q)i (1), log Y˜
(q)
i (0), log B˜
(q)
CP,i
}Nt
i=1
according to (14).
4 Draw
{
Σ−1,(q), δ(q), σ−2,(q)CP , δ
(q)
CP
}
according to (15)−(19) and (B.7)−(B.12).
end
B.5 Simulations
To demonstrate the validity of the more general Gibbs sampling algorithm provided above,
we replicate the simulations given in section 6. However, we now set ρ = 0.6, ν = 0, Ξ to
be the identity matrix and the initial value of ρ at the beginning of each MCMC to 0. All
remaining quantities and details of the procedure are the same as described in section 6.
Analogous results to those in Figures 2 and 3 are displayed below.
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Figure 4: Comparing BTS to A/B tests: interquartiles over 100 rounds across 1,000 simu-
lations 42
The results in terms of expected regret and convergence of optimality probabilities
are very similar to the ones obtained when ρ = 0. In only 39 out of the 1,000 simulations
the more general algorithm did not stop before the hundredth round, and it found the
corret ATE in 98.13% of simulations in which it did stop early.
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Figure 5: Histogram of stopping times across simulations with early stoppage
We also experimented with utilizing Algorithm 2 when the DGP is such that ρ 6= 0.
While this arguably implies that the model becomes misspecificed, we found that not only
does the algorithm still correctly identifies the true best arm, with results being qualita-
tively and quantitatively similar to those displayed in section 6, but it is also faster and
simpler to implement than Algorithm 3. Hence, in practice it might be preferable to the
practitioner to use Algorithm 2 even when it is not assumed that ρ 6= 0. However, given
the misspecification it is important to acknowledge that such procedure might interfere
with the interpretation of the stopping rule suggested in section 5.6.
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